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Abstract
This paper presents a New Economic Geography model with distortionary taxation
and endogenized transport costs. Tax revenues ¯nance a public good, infrastructure.
We show that the introduction of costly public investment in infrastructure leads to
more pronounced agglomeration patterns. With respect to the regions sizes, in the
periphery, the price-index for manufacturing goods decreases, whereas for the core,
the price-index is rather high since the distortionary e®ect of taxes dominates. Free
riding is bene¯cial for the periphery, which can devote all its tax revenue to local
demand support, generating a positive home market e®ect and driving the catch-up
process.
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According to the European Commission, transport infrastructure improve-
ments play 'a key role in the e®orts to reduce regional and social disparities in
the European Union, and in the strengthening of its economic and social co-
hesion' (Commission of the European Communities (1999)). Hence, the Com-
mission supports and endorses the development of Trans-European Transport
Networks (TEN-T) also 30 axes of priority, which now also encompass the new
Eastern European member states, for instance a corridor from Tallin via Riga
and Warsaw to Bratislava and Vienna (see Commission of the European Com-
munities (2005)). Both the European Union as well as national governments
will contribute to its ¯nancing. According to Commission of the European
Communities (2005), total costs are estimated to be around 330 billion Euros
in the period from 2007-2013, where more than half of these costs need to be
covered by the member states and other non-EU-related sources. Those TEN-
T's are a key element in the revised 'Lisbon strategy for competitiveness and
employment in Europe', since the EU considers good transport infrastructure,
and good accessibility for and of all its members as a key element for economic
development in Europe.
The economic literature seems to support this view. According to Limao and
Venables (1999), the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to transport
costs is estimated at around ¡2:5, i.e., halving transport costs increases the
volume of trade by a factor of ¯ve. For outside the EU, Fan and Zhang (2004)
in a study on Chinese rural regions con¯rm that infrastructure is a key to
rural development, particularly in all non-agricultural sectors. Henderson et
al. (2001) point into a similar direction for African countries and regions.
2In this paper we look at the users of infrastructure, ¯rms and consumers, and
we explore the links between infrastructure and its (public) ¯nancing through
taxes. The vehicle being employed in this paper is a simple New Economic
Geography (henceforth: NEG) model following Krugman (Krugman, 1991a,b)
and Fujita et al. (1999), where we put two things into the focus of research,
(i) endogenizing transport cost, and (ii) regional governments and taxation.
According to Puga (2002), those models are suitable for this type of analysis,
since they focus on the relations between transport costs, agglomeration, and
regional disparities, which makes them especially useful for studying to study
the role of (transport) infrastructure.
The endogenization of transport costs comes in two steps. First, introducing a
corporate sales tax generates revenues for the regions. Regional governments
allocate these tax revenues between infrastructure investments and lump-sum
transfers to their respective region's population. Second, the infrastructure is
being built using the same production technology as for the manufactured
good. The quantity of infrastructure provided is weighted by a scaling and
e±ciency parameter which determines the amount by which the transport
costs are being reduced. These reduced transport costs, of course, in°uence
the ¯rms' decisions on location and trade.
In the literature on NEG and international trade, there have been a lot of
theoretical and empirical contributions investigating public ¯nance, taxation-
related problems and, on the other hand, transport costs. As to the former,
the literature dates back to the basic tax competition model (for an excellent
survey, see Wilson (1999) and Krogstrup (2002)). More recent contributions
include Andersson and Forslid (2003) who build a NEG-model where the tax
revenue collected is used to ¯nance a public good entering the utility function.
3They use the analytically solvable model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and
analyze how the tax competition game between countries a®ects the distribu-
tion of workers; they ¯nd that even perfectly coordinated tax increases across
countries destabilize the dispersion equilibrium of workers.
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) focus on international tax competition and start
from the observation that in the European integration process a downward
levelling of tax rates has not been observable so far, but there is rather a
gradual increase in taxation as the integration process moves on. Similarly
to Puga's bell-shaped agglomeration pattern (see Puga, 1999) which emerges
during integration (i.e. disparities between regions ¯rst become large, then
diminish), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) ¯nd the same for tax rates. By using
a simple two-region NEG-model in which governments collect taxes from ¯rms'
pro¯ts, they challenge the result of the standard tax-competition literature
predicting a race to the bottom in tax rates in order to attract ¯rms. They
insert agglomeration issues to explain the dynamics of industrial integration
and tax rates in Europe.
As for the literature on transport costs, the way they are usually being mod-
elled is the "iceberg" assumption, formally introduced by Samuelson (1952,
1954), even though the ¯rst formulation dates back to Von ThÄ unen (1826).
Bottazzi and Ottaviano (1996) present an overview of various attempts to
deal with transport costs in international trade, and provide a general model
to evaluate iceberg transport costs, and other alternatives of modelling trans-
portation in international trade.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide a theoretical and empirical analysis
of all costs involved in shipping a good from the producer to the ¯nal consumer,
4also addressing some important measurement issues. Duranton and Storper
(2005) start from the empirical observation of declining transport costs, and
propose a model of vertically linked industries in which providing a given level
of quality to suppliers becomes more costly with distance. Their conclusion is
that, due to the fact that lower transport costs imply that higher quality inputs
are traded in equilibrium, trade costs can increase despite lower transport
costs.
Larch (2005) introduces a model of international trade with multinational en-
terprises with a separate and multinationalized transport sector. This allows,
for instance, to relax the assumption that transport costs are the same for
all goods, and to disentangle the production of goods and transport services.
However, there are still exogenously given transport costs for shipping goods.
Kilkenny (1998) deals with transport costs in a general equilibrium model us-
ing a bilateral regional Social Accounting Matrix, speci¯cally aimed at rural
development issues. She shows the existence of an initially negative, but ulti-
mately positive relationship between a reduction of transport costs and rural
development. The basic intuition is that reducing transport costs from rural
locations may also reduces transport costs to rural areas.
However, in all these contributions, transport costs are still exogenously given.
Our contribution looks at regional governments who collect distortionary taxes
via a corporate sales tax, so to ¯nance investment in public infrastructure,
which in turn decrease transport costs. It can be shown that public infrastruc-
ture investments lead to more pronounced agglomeration patterns, i.e. the
concentration of industries is fostered, which con¯rms previous results by An-
dersson and Forslid (2003) or Baldwin et al. (2003). Nonetheless, this is also
5bene¯cial for the region ending up as the periphery, since also in this region
the price index for manufactured goods decreases, which is due to cheaper im-
ported product varieties. The reduction of transport costs is very e®ective for
high initial values of trade costs (i.e. before infrastructure investments), while
there are less absolute e®ects when transport costs are already low. In terms
of regional policy, it can be shown that it might be useful if such infrastructure
investments are only ¯nanced by the central region (i.e., the periphery receiv-
ing for instance structural funds bene¯ts by the EU, or - in terms of modeling
- being a free rider in infrastructure provision), since both regions bene¯t from
such investments, while the periphery can spend its locally collected taxes for
local purposes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model, Section 3 brie°y lines out the analyses being conducted. Section 4
investigates the core-periphery patterns, as well as the e®ects of the infras-
tructure provided on trade costs and ¯rms, whereas Section 5 looks at the
sensitivity of the model and provides additional insights regarding the major
policy parameters. The last Section summarizes and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
There are two regions, referred to as region 1 and 2, and indexed as fi;jg =
f1;2g. Both regions produce two goods, X and Z. Z is a homogenous agricul-
tural good produced at constant returns to scale by a competitive industry. X-
goods (manufacturing goods) are di®erentiated in the usual Dixit and Stiglitz
6(1977) fashion. Firms may sell on the local market and export to the other
region, where the number of ¯rms from region i is denoted by ni. Therefore,
Xij are the exports of region i-based ¯rms to region j1. Xic denotes the con-
sumption of X in region i, being a CES aggregate of the individual varieties.
The utility of region i (Ui) can thus be formulated as follows:
Ui =X
¹
















where ¹ denotes the Cobb-Douglas expenditure share for di®erentiated prod-
ucts, and ¾ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
We assume that Z-goods are costlessly tradable across regions, whereas X-
goods trade incurs iceberg transport costs (¿), which are symmetric for either
direction of shipment. In terms of quantity, one unit of consumption of an
X-variety in region j requires a ¯rm in i to send (1 + ¿) units. For conve-
nience, quantities of X are de¯ned as ¯rm-speci¯c productions for the re-
spective foreign market. However, as in our model transport costs may vary
with government expenditures (as outlined below), the transport costs are not
exogenously given in this setting.
As usual, the consumer's maximization problem can be solved in two steps. In
the ¯rst step, each variety Xji needs to be chosen such that it minimizes the
cost of attaining Xic, whatever the consumption of Xic is. In the second step,
consumers allocate income between the Z-good, and the composite X-good.
Let pji be the price of an X-variety in region i produced by a ¯rm in region j.
The price for the homogenous agricultural good, qi, is indexed once, since all
(indigenous and foreign) homogenous goods consumed at a single location i
7must face the same price qi. We take q1 as the num¶ eraire. Further, Pi denotes
the price aggregator, de¯ned as the minimum cost of buying one unit of Xi at





pjiXji s.t. Xi = 1: (2)




i ®Yi 8 i;j 2 f1;2g; (3)
where Yi denotes total expenditures of consumers in region i. Identical price
elasticities of demand and identical marginal costs (technologies) within a re-
gion ensure that the price of a locally produced manufacturing good is equal to
the mill price for exports. Hence, prices of all manufacturing goods produced in
one region are equal in equilibrium. pi denotes the price of all goods produced
in region i. With these assumptions, the price aggregator Pi of di®erentiated





i + nj ((1 + ¿)pj)
1¡¾i 1
1¡¾ : (4)
Note that due to the adopted assumptions about technology, factor markets,
and demand ¡ in equilibrium ¡ pi ´ pii = pji and pj(1 + ¿) ´ pji = pii. The










82.2 Factor Markets, Production and Income
Let wLi and wTi denote the nominal factor rewards of labor and land in re-
gion i, respectively. There is perfect competition in the Z-sector, and each ¯rm
produces under constant returns to scale using a CES production technology,
employing labor (L) and land (T) (where 'b' is the coe±cient for T and '1¡b'
for L), with an elasticity of substitution of 1=(1 ¡ ½z) and (¡1 < ½z < 1).
As all ¯rms face the same factor prices and the CES technology is homo-






½z , all ¯rms
in a region face the same unit input coe±cients. The region speci¯c unit in-
put coe±cients for the two factors of Z-production can be derived by cost























































Variable unit costs (i.e., marginal costs) cZi satisfy
cZi ¸ aLziwLi + aTziwTi ? Zii ¸ 0; (9)
where ? indicates that at least one of the adjacent conditions has to hold with
equality. This implies
cZi ¸ qj ? Zij ¸ 0: (10)
There is monopolistic competition in the X-sector, and again each ¯rm pro-
duces under a CES production technology, using labor (L) and land (T) (where
9'a' is the coe±cient for L and '1 ¡ a' for T), with an elasticity of substitu-
tion of 1=(1 ¡ ½x) and (¡1 < ½x < 1). As all ¯rms face the same factor
prices and the CES technology is homothetic and exhibits constant returns
to scale, [aL
½x




½x, all ¯rms in a region face the same unit in-
put coe±cients. The region speci¯c unit input coe±cients for the two factors
























































Additionally, X-sector ¯rms require labor (aLni) and land to set up plants
(aTni), leading to increasing returns to scale in production.
Factor market clearing in region i for labor (Li) and land (Ti) requires
Li ¸aLxini (Xii + Xij) + aLnini + aLxiIi +
aLziwLi (Zii + Zij) ? wLi ¸ 0; (13)
Ti ¸aTxini (Xii + Xij) + aTnini + aTxiIi +
aTziwTi (Zii + Zij) ? wTi ¸ 0; (14)
where Ii denotes the infrastructure provided in region i.
Variable unit costs of producing an X-variety in region i are given by cXi =
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi. There is a ¯xed markup over variable costs, which is de-
termined by the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Given that under
CES-utility demand for all varieties is positive, the price setting behavior by







where taxi represents the tax rate imposed on ¯rms pro¯ts in order to ¯nance
public infrastructure provision, which will be laid out in the next subsection.
Free entry implies that ¯rms earn zero pro¯ts, since operating pro¯ts are used
to cover ¯xed costs. The corresponding zero pro¯t condition determines the
numbers of ¯rms.
Manufacturing ¯rms in i have to bear ¯xed costs of FCni = aLiwLi +aTniwTi.
The zero pro¯t condition, therefore, implies
FCni ¸
pi (Xii + Xij)
¾
(1 ¡ taxi) ? ni ¸ 0: (16)
All factors are owned by the households, so that consumer income (i.e., GNP)
in region i is given by
Yi = wLiLi + wTiTi + (1 ¡ ·i)Gi (17)
The equivalence of total factor income (Yi, Yj) and demand in each region
implicitly balances payments between regions.










i ; k 2 fL;Tg: (18)
112.3 Taxation, Infrastructure, and Transport Costs
In our model we aim at endogenizing transport cost by tax-¯nanced and pub-
licly provided infrastructure.
Taxes (taxi) are introduced as a distortionary sales tax. The pro¯t function
of ¯rms therefore becomes
¦i = pi (Xii + Xij)(1 ¡ taxi) ¡ cXi (Xii + Xij) ¡ FCni; (19)
where ¦i are the pro¯ts of a region i ¯rm.








Hence, the total tax revenues, and subsequently total government spending in
region i is
Gi = taxipini (Xii + Xij) + TRi; (21)
where TRi are transfers by other administrative bodies to region i's govern-
ment, such as contributions by the European Commission's structural funds
to regional development policy measures. These transfers are exogenous to the
model, i.e. public spending in region i can be higher than its actual budget
without incurring a de¯cit.
From these tax revenues, a fraction 0 < ·i < 1 is devoted to infrastructure
building, and the remaining fraction 1 ¡ ·i is used for lump-sum transfers to
12region i's population. For simplicity, we assume that the production technology
for infrastructure is the same as for manufacturing goods, but without being
subject to economies of scale. Thus, the amount of infrastructure (Ii) being





We assume that both regions' infrastructure contributes to the reduction of
transport costs for shipments between the two regions. Hence, the resulting
endogenously determined value for transport costs is determined by
¿ =
ti
(Ii + Ij + 1)
¯; (23)
where ti is an 'initial value' for transport costs, which also corresponds to a
'no-tax scenario' without taxes and infrastructure, i.e. to the standard NEG-
model with exogenously given transport costs. It may also be regarded as
general impediments to trade between the two regions. 0 < ¯ < 1 is a scaling
parameter which also re°ects the 'e®ectiveness' of the infrastructure provided.
Furthermore, note that both regions' infrastructure investments simultane-
ously a®ect the actual reduction of trade costs (¿).
3 Analyzing the Model
The analysis of the model is conducted along several lines of investigation.
First, the standard agglomeration structure will be evaluated, which means
for this model, that the 'initial value' of transport costs, i.e. the value of t that
would apply for a scenario without taxes, varies from 1% to 99% of the price
of X-goods. Since publicly provided and tax-¯nanced infrastructure might be
13interpretable as quite many di®erent things, not just, say, better roads re-
ducing travel time, and hence physical transport costs between places, we
suggest to interpret the endogenous transport costs (¿) of the present model
more generally as trade costs. This is especially important in our model, since
regional public authorities usually do not have the opportunity to in°uence
'pure' transport costs, but they rather can try to generally improve their re-
gion's competitive position. Secondly, we look at variations of the parameters
which are of our primary interest, the tax rate (tax), and the fraction of gov-
ernment expenditures devoted to infrastructure building (·). This also serves
to analyze the model's sensitivity to parameter changes. Thus, the main focus
of the following analyses is put on investigating how the parameters which
may be in°uenced by policy makers shape the economy.
In contrast to the standard NEG-models µ a la Krugman (1991b), production of
the manufacturing good uses two input factors (L and T). In those models it
is straightforward to assume that the factor used in the manufacturing sector
is mobile across regions. In line with the literature, all factors are immobile
in the short run. In the long run, we investigate situations where L is mobile
across regions. We have chosen the following parameter values for all of the
following simulations: ¾ = 4, ¹ = 0:35, ¯ = 0:1, a = b = 0:8, ½x = ½z = ¡0:5,
L = L1 + L2 = 60, T = T1 + T2 = 100, t = 0:7 if constant, taxi = taxj = 0:2
if constant, ·i = ·j = 1 if constant.
4 Core-Periphery Patterns, Firms, and Trade Costs
In Figure 1 we show the no-tax and no-infrastructure bifurcation diagram.
This is obtained by setting both the tax rates and, therefore, the infrastruc-
14ture expenditures equal to zero, and varying the initial impediments to trade
(t) between 1% and 99% of the price of manufacturing goods, which gives
the usual bifurcation diagrams2. The results show that the main qualitative
results from Krugman (1991b) can be replicated, i.e., there is agglomeration
at low trade costs, and dispersion at higher trade costs. Due to our produc-
tion technology assumptions (CES production function in both sectors, and
°exible input coe±cients) there is no full-agglomeration equilibrium. However,
there is still partial agglomeration at lower initial values of trade costs, and
a symmetric equilibrium at higher values of t. Then, in Figure 2 we activate
taxes and infrastructure spending by setting the tax rates in both region to
taxi = 0:2 and ·i = 13. The endogenization of trade costs through public
infrastructure investments leads the partially agglomerated equilibrium to be
sustainable for a larger range of trade costs. The endogenization of trade costs
through public infrastructure investments in this framework leads the partially
agglomerated equilibrium to be sustainable for a larger range of trade costs.
The infrastructure provided by the regions' governments allows the agglom-
erated equilibrium to remain stable for higher initial (i.e., no-tax) values of
trade costs. This result con¯rms Baldwin et al. (2003, Ch. 17), who ¯nd that
infrastructure which facilitates interregional trade leads to increased spatial
concentration. Baldwin et al. (2003, Ch. 17) also note that this subsequently
leads to higher growth in the whole economy (i.e., also in the periphery),
and to a decrease in nominal income inequalities between the center and the
periphery.
¡ Figures 1 and 2 ¡
Lower trade costs due to public infrastructure investments also in°uence re-
gional disparities. The price index of manufacturing goods decreases as trade
15costs diminish. This e®ect is the net result of two opposing forces, (i) lower
trade costs leading to lower costs for imported goods, hence constituting a
positive price index e®ect, and (ii) more goods need to be imported since
some ¯rms might have an incentive to relocate to the center, which in turn
means that more goods have to be imported in total, resulting in a negative
price index e®ect.
Comparing the di®erences of the price indices for manufacturing goods in the
benchmark case to the no-tax (and hence no-infrastructure) scenario, it turns
out that the di®erences in price index ratios is high at high trade costs, and
approach zero as trade costs approach zero. As a result, public infrastruc-
ture provision by regional authorities is bene¯cial for the center as well as
the periphery, since the prices for manufacturing goods also decrease in the
periphery despite hosting less ¯rms as trade costs diminish (for the latter,
see also Figure 7, left panel). Looking at Figure 3, it can be seen that at
low values of t, the are almost no di®erences in the price indices between the
small (peripheral) and the large (central) region. At higher t's, the smaller
region's price index decreases compared to the no-infrastructure setting, since
infrastructure reduces transport costs, and hence the price of imported goods.
The larger region does not enjoy these bene¯ts since it host already the major
share of ¯rms. Therefore, infrastructure investments do not play an important
role, but instead the larger region su®ers from the taxes imposed. This result
con¯rms Kilkenny (1998) who ¯nds that a reduction of transport costs in rural
areas leads to an improvement in rural development.
¡ Figure 3 ¡
16Looking at the amount of tax revenues, which subsequently become govern-
ment expenditures, we ¯nd a La®er-curve shape as the size of a region varies.
The maximum tax revenues are reached when a region hosts around 75% of the
workers, depending on the value of t (see Figure 4). Note that this corresponds
to the size of the larger region in the partially agglomerated equilibrium of
Figure 2.
¡ Figure 4 ¡
Changes in the exogenously given tax rate (tax) cause the agglomeration equi-
librium to be sustainable for a larger range of values of t than in the benchmark
case, provided that the tax rate does not become too high. Quite similar e®ects
are observable when altering the fraction of government expenditures devoted
to infrastructure provision (·). The higher ·, the more sustainable agglom-
eration becomes due to the fact that more (or better) infrastructure will be
provided. But also a ·i = ·j = 0 does not lead to a symmetric agglomeration
equilibrium only. Of course, in this case no infrastructure can be provided to
reduce trade costs, but at lower initial values of t a core-periphery structure
emerges in this case, too.
If one region free rides in infrastructure provision, i.e. ·i = 0 while ·j > 0, a
somewhat di®erent picture develops (see Figure 5). In this situation, there is
again partial agglomeration at low trade costs. However, the smaller region's
equilibrium breaks as the initial trade costs approach about t = 0:5, while the
(at low t's) larger region's equilibrium agglomeration path remains sustainable
over the whole range of trade costs.
Note that as the smaller region's equilibrium breaks, the larger region's ag-
glomeration becomes signi¯cantly less pronounced. This equilibrium becomes
17the only one at higher trade costs, and decreases even slightly below ¸Li = 0:5.
This means that at higher initial trade costs, there emerges a picture which is
similar to the original core-periphery pattern, but slightly asymmetric. How-
ever, the asymmetry is not as pronounced as one might have expected it. The
free riding region is almost of equal size as the other one (¸Li ¼ 0:48). This
is due to the fact that there is no interregional tax competition in the present
setup, and that the region which free rides in infrastructure provision trans-
fers its entire tax revenues lump-sum to its population generating additional
income and hence additional demand. Therefore, there are always some ¯rms
having incentives to locate in the free riding region.
Looking at this result from a social planner's perspective, we ¯nd that free rid-
ing for a smaller, or a peripheral region is bene¯cial. A region which should be
better connected to central regions by implementing regional policy measures,
therefore, should not contribute to public infrastructure investments if initially
the trade costs are high (i.e., before implementing any policy measures). This
is due to the fact that the free riding region keeps their tax revenues within the
region and generates additional income through the lump-sum redistribution
of the tax revenues among its population. A better infrastructure, although
¯nanced by a di®erent region, develops the connections between those regions
such that it becomes possible, also for the more remotely located region, to
attract additional ¯rms. Note, that instead of tax competition, the role of com-
petition in this model is played by the independent decision of each regional
government to set its ·, i.e. to divide its government expenditures between in-
frastructure investment and lump-sum transfers to its respective population.
¡ Figure 5 ¡
18Asymmetric taxation between the two regions exclusively leads to agglomer-
ation in the region with the lower tax rate (region j in this case). This is a
quite intuitive a result since the region with a lower tax rate attracts more
¯rms which in turn attract more workers (see Figure 6). Note that region i
always remains small in this scenario (it is the only stable equilibrium), while
region j is rather big.
¡ Figure 6 ¡
A similar result, though through a di®erent channel, occurs when the endow-
ment with land (T) di®ers across region. In this case, there is agglomeration
in the region endowed with more land. This is due to the fact that both goods,
X and Z, require some T in production and X-sector ¯rms also need land as
a ¯xed input for setting up their production plant. Only at very low initial
trade costs, agglomeration in the smaller region (in terms of T) may be a long
run stable equilibrium.
Varying the scaling and e±ciency parameter ¯ shows that a higher ¯ leads
(i) to a more signi¯cant reduction in trade costs (¿) which in turn makes (ii)
the partially agglomerated equilibrium more sustainable, also at higher initial
values of trade costs (t).
Looking at region i's share of ¯rms and at the infrastructure provided in region
i, we note several things. First, if region i has less than about 20% of the
world's endowment with labor (see the ¸Li-axis in Figures 7 and 8, left panel
in each case), there are no ¯rms headquartered in region i (Figure 7), and thus
there is also no infrastructure being provided by region i (Figure 8). The two
right hand panels of these two ¯gures show the same analyses for asymmetric
taxation (taxi = 0:5, while taxj remains at its original value of 0.2). Figure 7
19shows that due to the higher tax rate in region i, the area without any ¯rms
in region i increases by about 50%, and hence also the area where region i is
not able to provide public infrastructure4. From Figure 6 we know that the
only stable equilibrium con¯guration for workers emerges when region i hosts
about 25% of the workers (in region j there are the remaining about 75%).
Hence, in this asymmetric taxation-scenario, only the region with lower taxes
(i.e., region j) will host ¯rms (for all values of t or ¿). Thus, region i needs
to import all of its manufacturing goods from region j. This constitutes the
same result as a full-agglomeration equilibrium of a standard model, despite
region i hosting some of the workers in our scenario. The tax-rate-di®erential
(of 30%) between both regions outweighs the rather large share of workers in
region i. Looking at the right panel of Figure 7, if region i was very large (i.e.,
at a large ¸Li), ¯rms would have an incentive to relocate to j because of the
lower tax rate there, until the stable equilibrium is reached.
¡ Figures 7 and 8 ¡
Turning to the endogenized trade costs (¿), and investigating the in°uence of
public infrastructure provision on the reduction of trade costs, we generally
¯nd the following. The higher the initial trade costs are, the larger the absolute
e®ect of infrastructure, and thus the larger the reduction of trade costs will
be. Hence, the absolute decrease of trade costs caused by infrastructure in-
vestments is higher if the initial impediments to trade are high. This decrease
would be even stronger if the scaling and e±ciency parameter ¯ was higher,
also at higher tax rates. In other words, for regions being rather remote from
economic centers and having high interregional impediments to trade, it makes
more sense to strengthen the infrastructure network than for quite integrated
or centrally located regions where trade costs are already quite low.
20Some of the above ¯ndings can easily be seen by inspecting the equations on
infrastructure provision, equations 21, 22, and 23. Plugging equation 21 into
22, we obtain
Ii =
·i [taxipini (Xii + Xij) + TRi]
aLxiwLi + aTxiwTi
; (24)









Inspecting equation 24, public infrastructure investments are generally facili-
tated by higher taxes (since there is more money to be spent), a larger number
of ¯rms and higher quantities being produced in a region (more ¯rms pro-
ducing higher quantities pay more taxes). Consequently, this leads to larger
reductions of trade costs (see equation 25). Additionally, a higher e±ciency
of the infrastructure provided (i.e., a higher ¯), also leads to a stronger re-
duction of trade costs. Similarly, some external funding via transfer payments
(where 'external' means external to regional budgets, denoted by TR in the
above equations) facilitates and increases regional public infrastructure pro-
vision. Clearly, infrastructure becomes more expensive, and thus its provision
decreases, as the factor prices and/or the factor input requirements rise.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the model can be analyzed in several ways, which also pro-
vides additional insights. Apart from doing the fairly standard simulation
exercise of varying transport costs (which in this paper means varying the
21initial impediments to trade, t), we also simulate variations of the two policy
parameters tax and ·. We call these two parameters 'policy parameters', since
these two values may be chosen by the regional decision makers. Additionally,
various t's for these two scenarios are being tested.
5.1 Variations of ¹, ¾ and ½
Variations of the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the di®erenti-
ated manufacturing good, ¾, and the technical rate of substitution between
input factors, ½, show that the model's reactions are very stable. In terms of the
bifurcation diagrams, this means that they are either stretched or compressed
(i.e., more or less pronounced agglomeration equilibria) or shifted to the left or
to the right (i.e., more or less sustainable agglomeration or dispersion equilib-
ria) as it has to be expected qualitatively by the respective parameter change.
The same applies for the income expenditure share for manufactures, ¹, where
a higher ¹ leads to stronger agglomerations in equilibrium.
5.2 Variations of the tax rate and the government expenditures for infras-
tructure
Varying the tax rate (tax) and the fraction of government expenditures de-
voted to infrastructure building (·) shows no e®ect as the initial trade costs
are high (t = 0:7). We have ¯rst chosen a rather high value of t for the analyses,
in order to be able to re°ect the situation that may occur between centrally
and peripherally located regions. As all the bifurcation diagrams from before
show, there is always a stable symmetric equilibrium only at these values of
22t. Hence, variations of tax and · only a®ect more integrated economies with
lower trade costs.
At t = 0:2, the opposite picture develops. Here, agglomeration is a sustainable
equilibrium for all values of both tax and ·, since trade costs are simply
low enough to render agglomeration sustainable, no matter how the other
parameters are con¯gured.
As the fraction of government expenditures devoted to infrastructure invest-
ments, ·, varies from 0 to 1, interesting insights may be gained as far as the
development of trade costs (¿) is concerned. Figure 9 (left panel) shows that
an equal division of the government expenditures between infrastructure in-
vestments and transfers to the population (i.e. · = 0:5) leads to a reduction
of trade costs by about 0.09. An additional increase of · up to · = 1 reduces
trade costs only by a further 0.03 points. Thus, a region's government needs
to account for this decreasing utility of infrastructure investments when de-
ciding on its policy measures. The right panel of Figure 9 shows that a higher
e±ciency of infrastructure provision (¯) increases the reduction of trade costs,
while the decreasing utility of infrastructure investments remains evident.
¡ Figure 9 ¡
Variations of the tax rate do not show any signi¯cant changes in the core-
periphery patterns as long as they are coordinated in both regions. Also, the
development of tax revenues and infrastructure provision is una®ected by co-
ordinated changes in the tax rate. However, the e®ects on trade costs are
noteworthy. No matter what the tax rate is, trade costs are lowest when work-
ers (and industries) are concentrated in either of the regions, whereas they
tend to be somewhat higher when the regions are of equal size (see Figure 10).
23¡ Figure 10 ¡
6 Conclusions
In this paper we endogenize transport (trade) costs using the basic New Eco-
nomic Geography model, in which we also enrich the production side by al-
lowing two factors of production. The endogenization of transport costs comes
in two steps. First, introducing a corporate sales tax generates revenues for
the regions. Regional governments allocate these tax revenues between in-
frastructure investments and a lump-sum transfer to their respective region's
population. Second, the infrastructure is being built using the same production
technology as for the manufactured good. The quantity of infrastructure pro-
vided is weighted by a scaling and e±ciency parameter determines the amount
by which the transport costs are being reduced. These reduced transport costs
enter into the model in°uencing the ¯rms' decisions on location and trade.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, con¯rming the previous re-
sults from Andersson and Forslid (2003) or Baldwin et al. (2003), although
in di®erent settings, we show that the introduction of costly public invest-
ment in infrastructure leads to more pronounced agglomeration patterns: the
core-periphery pattern becomes more sustainable for a wider range of initial
trade costs. Varying the tax rate (or the fraction of public revenue devoted to
infrastructure) renders the agglomeration equilibrium even more sustainable,
provided that the tax rate does not become too high. The stability of core-
periphery equilibrium is further supported by the ¯nding according to which
public revenue is maximized when one of the region hosts approximately 75%
of the manufacturing industries.
24Second, the e®ects on prices are the following. With respect to the regions
sizes, for the region ending up as periphery, generally the price-index for man-
ufacturing goods decreases, since the import-price-e®ect prevails on the nega-
tive price-index e®ects. For the region ending up as the core, the price-index is
rather high since the distortionary e®ect of increased taxation (used to ¯nance
infrastructure) dominates. With respect to initial trade cost, we ¯nd that as
they approach zero, the price-index with infrastructure spending approaches
the value of the same index without infrastructure spending. As trade costs in-
crease, the former decreases, thereby displaying the bene¯cial e®ects of public
investment.
Third, free riding is bene¯cial. We show that having infrastructure being ¯-
nanced only by the larger region makes its equilibrium agglomeration path
sustainable over the whole range of initial trade costs. Furthermore, the pe-
riphery can devote all its tax revenue to local demand support, thereby gen-
erating additional income and a positive home market e®ect (which actually
ends up driving the catch-up process).
Finally, decreasing marginal utility of infrastructure spending, and the im-
portance of the e±ciency parameter, strengthen the conclusion that at high
initial trade costs it is socially desirable to increase taxation (especially in the
larger region) in order to ¯nance public investment.
However, our framework lacks interregional tax competition, and the strategic
interactions between core and periphery regarding infrastructure building. We
feel that in this direction, enriched by public ¯nance considerations about
di®erent types of taxation on di®erent agents, some promising analysis can be
carried out in the future.
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Notes
1Whenever we use i and j from the set f1;2g, this implies that i 6= j.
2In all the bifurcation diagrams, solid lines denote long-run stable equilibria,
whereas dotted lines depict unstable equilibria.
3Figure 2 constitutes the benchmark case for all the subsequent analyses and
comparisons.
4Note that in those cases where the share of ¯rms in region i is zero and no
infrastructure is being provided, also the tax revenues and hence government ex-
penditures are zero.
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Fig. 1. Standard CP-pattern without taxation and infrastructure, and ¸T = 0:5.
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Fig. 3. Di®erence in the price-index ratio for manufacturing goods between the

















































































































Fig. 5. Core-periphery pattern with region i free riding in infrastructure provision,
and ¸T = 0:5.











































































































































Fig. 7. Share of ¯rms in region i (left panel, benchmark case) and with taxi = 0:5

















































































Fig. 8. Infrastructure provided in region i (left panel, benchmark case) and with
taxi = 0:5 and taxj = 0:2 (right panel).








































Fig. 10. Trade costs as the tax rate varies.
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